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Based on Arrow’s model of a pure exchange economy with smooth consumption
externalities, this paper studies how the internalization of external effects through
a network of markets between agents introduces symmetry breakings in the set of
equilibria. It shows indeed how identical agents can be treated asymmetrically by
complete markets. This work emphasizes that equilibrium allocations may be very
sensitive to the way Coase-type rights are distributed: Journal of Economic
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1. Introduction
It is often asserted that all models in which equilibria are not necessarily
Pareto efficient give rise to sunspot equilibria, more precisely, to equilibria
that are neither walrasian nor Pareto efficient, as those exhibited by Cass
and Shell [5]. As examples of such models, those dealing with externalities
are often cited (see Shell [15] and Spear [17]), although few of them are
studied in the literature. It is indeed well known that the presence of exter-
nalities in the economy generally prevents equilibria from being Pareto
efficient for the simple reason that there is no trade on external effects. In
other words, it is due to the fact that external effects are not completely
internalized. Claiming that such inefficient equilibria are sunspots would
not be satisfactory for a lot of reasons. One could argue that the concept
of Pareto efficiency is not appropriate in such a framework, or that the
market fails to implement efficient allocations because of its incomplete-
ness, to the extent that all the costs entailed by the economic behavior of
an agent are not taken into account by this agent, and then the sunspots
observed could belong to the large and well studied category of sunspots
due to incomplete markets. Then it may be helpful for the understanding
of that problem to define clearly some models of economies with externalities
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in which the concept of sunspot equilibria appears to be as usual a powerful
one. The existence of sunspot phenomena should imply strong and
distinctive properties of the structure of the equilibrium set. The model
presented in this paper exhibits one kind of sunspot equilibria which is not
due to uncertainty, time, or market incompleteness but only to agents
inflicting external effects on each other.
Balasko [3] makes a thorough study of the mathematical structure of
models in which sunspot equilibria are likely to appear. He shows that
those phenomena consist essentially in symmetry breakings in the equation
system and are ruled out when the first welfare theorem holds true. Then
he asserts that the only two ways to obtain symmetry breakings are either
to consider non-convex preferences or to investigate models which rule
out the first welfare theorem, for example, by imposing multiple budget
constraints on some agents. This paper is based on these remarks. It tries
to give a convincing example of how externalities can give rise to ‘‘sunspot
equilibria’’ in Balasko’s sense of asymmetric equilibria (asymmetric
solutions of a symmetric system of equations). This reading of the concept
of sunspot equilibrium seems to be common sense in the framework of this
paper. It is indeed Arrow’s [1] static model of a pure exchange economy
without uncertainty, where the markets are totally complete and all the
externalities are internalized through a network of markets.1 One could
expect under such strong conditions to prevent phenomena like sunspots
from happening; however, they do not (even when preferences are assumed
to be convex, in which case the equilibrium is optimal) and that is why the
model enlightens the links between non-convexity of preferences, condi-
tions under which the first welfare theorem holds true and existence of
asymmetric equilibria.
Another point is raised by the occurrence of symmetry breakings under
such conditions. It is the very distinctive feature of Arrow’s model that
allow for those phenomena, and for which the standard symmetrization
argument fails. It is often argued that this model allows to reproduce by
analogy all the theoretical treatment performed for the standard Arrow
Debreu economy. This assertion deserves to be checked. That is the object
of Section 2, where the mathematical structure of the model is studied
through the accomplishment of the main stages developed by Balasko [2]
in his research program.
The idea of symmetry developed here is natural and has already been
introduced in studies about public goods (see, e.g., Champsaur [7] and
more recently Goenka [11] which focuses on fiscal policies). It consists in
asserting that agents with identical characteristics (i.e., with the same
335SYMMETRIC EXTERNALITIES
1 An illustration could be the market for polluting rights in the United States.
File: 642J 214103 . By:CV . Date:03:06:96 . Time:16:20 LOP8M. V8.0. Page 01:01
Codes: 3152 Signs: 2770 . Length: 45 pic 0 pts, 190 mm
preferences and endowments) should be treated identically by the market
and then come out with identical allocations. The issue of symmetry is
at the center of this article which focuses on resource allocation. Only
consumption externalities will be investigated here through Arrow’s model.
A set of new parameters (legal entitlements) are introduced. They charac-
terize the initial juridical situation from which the agents trade on external
effects. It is shown that, for a given bundle of initial endowments and legal
entitlements, an equilibrium obtains, which may be Pareto efficient. The
introduction of new dimensions of endowmentsthrough this network of
legal entitlementsincreases the number of parameters of the model. It
increases sufficiently to give enough new degrees of freedom to an economy
where the agents are identical, even in a full sense, for asymmetric equi-
libria to appear. What can be underlined is that internalizing externalities
may create some particular phenomena such as inequalities of treatment by
the market, bifurcations in the equilibrium manifold and instability. The
creation of markets to complete the economy is likely to provoke cycles or
chaos. The bottom line is that the final allocations seem to be very sensitive
to the distribution of liability rules. This non-neutrality result sounds like
an anti-Coase-theorem argument. There could then be another hint, in
addition to the presence of high transaction costs, to be careful, when
creating such markets, concerning the way to rule them: the distribution of
rights is not immune to giving rise to ‘‘undesirable’’ phenomena.
This paper is organized as follows. The basic model is described and its
mathematical structure is studied in Section 2. Then the concepts of iden-
tity between the agents and of symmetric versus asymmetric equilibria
are developed and commented on in Section 3, first through the simple
example of an economy with two agents and then in a general framework.
In Section 4, the existence of asymmetric equilibria is proved for the
general framework, and is more specifically commented on in the case
where all the utility functions, proper or external, are concave; in par-
ticular, the problem of the optimality of the allocations will be discussed.
Then, Section 5 investigates some conditions under which an equilibrium is
automatically symmetric; it tries to enlighten the distinctive features of the
model that are responsible for the asymmetries to appear. Section 6 con-
cludes with some remarks and comments. The two heavy proofs are con-
tained in the appendices.
2. The Basic Model
The study of the basic model will facilitate the communication of the
symmetric case. Another incentive is to clear up the accepted idea that
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Arrow’s [1] formalization allows to reproduce all the theoretical treatment
of the standard ArrowDebreu model. This section is self-contained.
The Agents and the Market
Consider a pure exchange economy with l commodities and m
consumers. The preferences of agent i are described by a utility function
which depends on the consumptions of all consumers. This implies
that external effects are associated with measurable commodities. The
consumptions and initial endowments are assumed to be strictly positive.
Furthermore the utility functions are assumed to be separable in proper
and external consumptions; they thus take the form
Ui (X )=ui (xi)+vi (x i),
where xi=(x (1)i , ..., x
(l )
i ) # R
l
++ denotes consumer i’s consumption,
x i=(x1 , ..., xi&1 , xi+1 , ..., xm) the consumptions of agents other than i, and
where X=(x1 , ..., xm) is the whole consumption vector.
The fundamental property of Arrow’s model is the individualization of
external effects. The vector x i is considered to be proper to agent i: it
represents how consumer i sees the consumptions of the other consumers,
other than i. Then x i is replaced by x~ i=(x1i , ..., x
i&1
i , x
i+1
i , ..., x
m
i )where
xki denotes agent k’s consumption seen from agent iis a variable appear-
ing in the utility function of consumer i, and in no one else’s. Xi denotes
the vector (x1i , ..., x
m
i ) # R
lm
++.
There are lm commodities for each agent. A huge number of new
commodities are thus artificially created: it is at this expense that the
consumption sets of the agents become independent. Agent i expresses a
demand for his external consumption, just as he does for his proper
consumption. This implies that there exists markets for external consump-
tion goods and that the agents behave on these markets just as they do on
the market for proper consumption goods, i.e., as price-takers.
The proper utility functions ui are assumed to be smooth, strictly
increasing, strictly concave and the closure of their indifference surfaces are
assumed to be contained in the strictly positive orthant; the first order
derivatives are supposed to tend to infinity on the frontier of the positive
orthant. On the other hand, the external utility functions vi are smooth but
are not assumed to be concave.2 We impose the two following assumptions
((C) and (N)) on the vi ’s.
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2 This assumption is not economically relevant. One can indeed easily imagine threshold
effects with respect to the consumption of external goods. Take, for example, the music your
neighbor listens to: externalities may be positive with modest consumptions and become
negative if he keeps listening all day long to the same kind of music that you are not
particularly fond of.
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(C)-Assumption. The first-order derivatives of vi are uniformly bounded
in a neighborhood of 0.
To be illustrated, this assumption merely states that even if you can feel
very upset when you see someone starving, you cannot feel as badly as if
you were starving yourself. As a matter of fact, most of consumption exter-
nalities come from abundant consumptions, which translates in first-order
derivatives that tend toward zero when the corresponding consumption
becomes very low.
It will also be assumed that there is at least one commodity, suppose it
is commodity l, for which the external effects inflicted by each agent on the
others are almost zero.3 More precisely, the marginal utility, for agent i,
following the consumption of an extra unit of commodity l by agent k is
negligible compared to the marginal utility following his own consumption
of this extra unit.
(N)-Assumption. For each i, there exists a real =i>0 close to zero4 such
that uniformly on R lm++ and for all k{i, one has
}vi (x~ i)x (l )k }<=i
ui (xi)
x (l )i
.
Let U denote the set of utility functions fulfilling the preceding assumptions.
The Budget Constraints
There is a market between each couple of agents (i, k). Consumer i faces
a market price p # Rl for his proper consumption xi , and a market price
pki # R
l for his external consumption xki regarding agent k (the latter can be
positive or negative whether agent i endures a positive or a negative exter-
nality). The quantity pki } x
k
i is paid directly to consumer k.
Reciprocally, consumer i receives the quantity pik } xi directly from
consumer k. In this last quantity, xi appears instead of xik since everything
is seen here from agent i ’s point of view, and he does not know how the
other agents see his proper consumption. Then agent i faces an indivi-
dualized price pii=pi=p&
h=m
h=1; h{i p
i
h # R
l
++ for his proper consumption.
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3 This assumption has already been made in the literature on externalities. Starrett [18]
notes that to rule out points of local Pareto satiation, a sufficient condition is the existence
of a commodity which every one finds desirable and with which no one associates any con-
sumption externalities; then the proposes labor, under the condition that no one is jealous of
his industrious neighbor.
4 See in Appendix 2.1 why =i<(m!)&1 is largely sufficient.
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The following price compatibility conditions5 follow from the definition of
pii=pi :
:
h=m
h=1
pih=p, \i, 1im. (1)
Let S denote the set of prices ( p, ( pki )1km; 1im) where pi # R
l
++ and
X the set of allocations (Xi)1im # R lm
2
++.
Let |i=(| (1)i , ..., |
(l )
i ) # R
l
++ denote the initial endowments of consumer
i in proper goods. Other parameters are introduced which define the initial
situation from which the agents trade on external consumptions. They are
legal entitlements, i.e., the rights given (by the juridical or political
authorities) to agent i on agent k, and reciprocally to k on i, in case of
external effects involving both k and i. A straightforward category of these
rights could be the liability rules for the damages caused by an agent on
another. It could be for example a ban issued by the director of a firm, on
smoking in offices unless there is a deal between all the persons working in
an office; in such a situation, it is clear that the non-smokers have a right
on the smokers: not to smoke is the situation of reference.
The legal entitlements of consumer k with respect to consumer i ’s
consumption, |ik , do not have to be equal to |i : what I have the right to
obtain from (resp. the duty to give to) someone else does not need to be
what he initially has (resp. I initially have). Since they do not correspond
to any real consumption, they are not assumed to be positive. Each agent
is endowed with a vector of initial endowments and legal entitlements
((|i), (|ki )1km, k{i) # R
l
++_R
l(m&1).
Consumer i’s budget constraint is
:
k=m
k=1
pki } x
k
i =p } |i+ :
k=m
k=1; k{i
pki } |
k
i & :
h=m
h=1; h{i
pih } |
i
h , (2)
where xii=xi . Let 0 denote the set of initial endowments
((|i)1im , (|ki )1i, km, k{i) which are elements of R
lm
++_R
lm(m&1).
The Equilibrium of an Economy
The external utility functions vi are not concave. It prevents us from
considering that the first-order conditions of the maximization of utility
339SYMMETRIC EXTERNALITIES
5 These conditions can be interpreted another way. To buy a unit of commodity j, agent i
has to buy it for himself (and pay p( j )i ) and he has also to ‘‘buy’’ it for the other agents (and
pay pk( j )i k{i ) in the sense that he has to fix damages for an external deseconomy (and then
pk( j )i is positive), or sees his consumption subsidized if it entails an external economy (then
pk( j )i is negative). Eventually, the resulting price, 
h=m
h=1 p
i( j )
h , must be the same for everybody,
i.e., the market price. David Cass pointed out to me that in Arrow [1] three relationships
come from profit maximization when agents are considered as producers of external effects.
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functions under budget constraints are sufficient. That is why two different
concepts of equilibrium are necessary, the classical one and an extended
one (Smale’s [16] terminology is used).
Definition 1. An economy is a vector ((|i), (|ki )) # 0 . A state of the
economy ((|i), (|ki )) is a vector Z=(( p, ( p
k
i )); (x
k
i ); ((|i), (|
k
i ))) #
S _X _0 . It is said to be attainable if it fulfills equations (1) and:6
:
i=m
i=1
xi= :
i=m
i=1
|i (3)
xki =xk (\k, i, 1k, im, k{i). (4)
Definition 2. A classical equilibrium of the economy ((|i), (|ki )) is a
vector ((*i)1im , Z) where Z is an attainable state such that Xi maxi-
mizes Ui under the budget constraint, and *i is the inverse of the associated
Lagrange multiplier. An extended equilibrium of the economy ((|i), (|ki )) is
a vector ((*i)1im , Z) fulfilling the first-order conditions of the former
maximization problem.
Denote by 4 the m-simplex: the set of vectors (*i)1im such that *i>0
and
:
i=m
i=1
*i=1. (5)
A classical equilibrium is obviously an extended equilibrium. Equation (5)
is the normalization condition chosen (considering (1), (3), and (4), the
budget constraint of consumer m is derived from those of the others); it
allows us to see the inverse Lagrange multipliers as welfare weights, a point
of view that becomes clearer through Eq. (7) below.
An extended equilibrium is defined by Eqs. (1), (3), (4), (5), the budget
constraints (2), and
{*iDui (xi)=pi*iDvki (x~ i)=pki
(6.1)
(6.2)
(6)
where Dvki (x~ i) denotes the derivatives of vi with respect to the variables x
k
i ,
k{i,
Dvki (x~ i)=
Dvi
Dxki
(x~ i).
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6 Equations (3) are the market clearing conditions on the standard market for proper
consumptions, Eqs. (4) are the market clearing conditions on the markets for external
consumptions. It states that what consumer i demands in terms of consumer k’s consumption
must eventually be equal to what consumer k effectively consumes.
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The system of equilibrium equations (1) to (6) is too disegregated. One
can easily give an equivalent system of equilibrium equations that exhibits
more obviously the structure of the set of equilibria. It is obtained by
removing all the variables related to the process of individualization of the
external effects, i.e., the individualized prices and the individualized external
commodities.
Lemma 3. An equivalent system of equilibrium equations is given by
equations (3) and (5), along with
*i Dui (xi)+ :
h=m
h=1, h{i
*h Dvih(x h)=p, 1im (7)
*i Dui (xi) } xi+ :
k=m
k=1, k{i
*i Dvki (x i) } xk
=p } |i+ :
k=m
k=1, k{i
*i Dvki (x i) } |
k
i & :
h=m
h=1, h{i
*h Dvih(x h) } |
i
h ,
1im&1. (8)
The present framework differs from the classical pure exchange economy
in three ways at leastso that the line of reasoning reproducing analogi-
cally all the results of the latter should be investigated carefully. First, the
market clearing conditions for external consumptions are different from
those for proper consumptions. Second, the assumption of concavity is
dropped for the external utility functions. Third, beside the initial endow-
ments in proper consumption goods, legal entitlements are introduced,
which represent the initial juridical situation from which the agents trade
on external consumptions.
Uniqueness of the Price Supporting an Equilibrium Allocation
With the convention that Dvii(X)=Dui (xi) and Dv
i
h(X )=Dv
i
h(x h), define
the following vector D ( j)i (X)=(Dv
i( j)
h (X))1hm # R
m. Equations (7) of
Lemma 3 can be rewritten
* } (D ( j )i &D
( j )
1 )(X )=0, 2im, 1jl (7$)
This means that, at an extended equilibrium, * is an element of norm 1 of
the orthogonal space (in Rm) of the space D(X) engendered by the l(m&1)
vectors: [(D ( j )i &D
( j )
1 )(X ), 2im, 1jl].
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Lemma 4. Each matrix with (m&1) rows extracted from the
m_l(m&1) matrix DV
((D (1)2 &D
(1)
1 ) } } } (D
(l )
2 &D
(l )
1 ) } } } (D
(1)
m &D
(1)
1 ) } } } (D
(l )
m &D
(l )
1 ))
has full rank at each allocation reached by an extended equilibrium.
Proof. This comes essentially from Assumption (N); see Appendix 2.1. K
This lemma entails that the fundamental property of uniqueness of the
price supporting an equilibrium allocation holds in this framework:
Proposition 5. If X is an allocation such that ( p, ( pki ); *; X ) is a vector
price-allocation reached by an extended equilibrium( p, ( pki );*) is a support-
ing price of Xthere does not exist another price supporting allocation X.
Proof. Obvious considering that *=(*i)1im is the normalized vector
of the orthogonal space of D(X) which has dimension (m&1) (in Rm). K
The Extended Equilibrium Manifold
Define the smooth map F(Ui) : R
l_Rm++ _Diag(X )_0  R
lm+l+m by
:
i=m
i=1
(xi&|i)
*iDui (xi)+ :
h=m
h1, h{i
*h Dvih(x h)&p
F(Ui)( p, *, X, 0)= \ :
i=m
i=1
*i+&1 .
*i Dui (xi) } xi+ :
k=m
k=1, k{i
*iDvki (x i) } (xk&|
k
i )
+ :
h=m
h=1, h{i
*h Dvih(x h) } |
i
h&p } |i
Lemma 6. The set V 1 of utility functions v1 # C(R l(m&1)++ , R) such that
0 is a regular value of F(Ui) , is an open and dense subset of C
(R l(m&1)++ , R).
Proof. See Appendix 2.2. K
This lemma yields straightforwardly, with the help of the regular value
theorem, the following result:
Theorem 7. For a generic set of external utility functions of the first
consumer, V 1 , the extended equilibrium set, E (Ui) , is a submanifold of S _
Rm_X _0 of dimension lm2.
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The equivalent system of equations given in Lemma 3 gives much infor-
mation about the structure of the extended equilibrium manifold. In such
a framework the solutions ( p, *, X) # Rl_Rm_R lm++ of Eqs. (5) and (7)
play the role of the no-trade equilibria, i.e., compose the ‘‘non-linear’’ part
of the manifold. However, the set they define does not have the close links
with the Pareto optima that it has in the classical framework without exter-
nalities. Although it is not difficult to prove that it is generically a manifold
of dimension l+m&1, there is no reason for it to be connected, unlike in
Balasko [2], and then the equilibrium manifold could be disconnected too.
However, still a point deserves to be stressed: fix such a vector ( p, *, X ),
then the set of 0 # 0 satisfying the remaining equations (3) and (8) is a
linear manifold of dimension lm2&l&m+1 which is a fiber of the equi-
librium manifold. The presence of fibers of such a high relative dimension
is a clear sign that the model investigated has a wealthy structure.7
Existence and Optimality of Equilibria
The technics followed here is essentially inspired from Balasko [2] and
Smale [16]. It consists in building a homotopy between the economy
under scope and the classical one of pure exchange without externalities
defined by the ui ’s and the |i ’s, which will be called the 0-economy.
This will be done by considering the t-economies defined by the utility
functions
Uit(X )=ui (xi)+tvi (x~ i).
The natural projection for the original economy: 6(Ui) : E (Ui)  0 by
6(Ui)(( p, *, X, 0))=((|i), (|
k
i )) is smooth. The economy 0=((|i),
(|ki )) # 0 is regular (resp. singular) if it is a regular (resp. singular) value
of the natural projection. The set of singular economies 7 is closed and of
Lebesgue measure zero in 0 . All these definitions and results are proved
and commented on in Balasko [2].
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7 The so-called Coase theorem [6] was sometimes read as stating the neutrality of the
distribution of legal entitlements with respect to the equilibrium allocations. We know it is
false since Buchanan and Stubblebine [4], and that it can merely be translated in a first
welfare theorem (see, e.g., Theorem 11 below and Cooter [8]). But the fact is that a
redistribution of legal entitlements within a fiber does not change the equilibrium allocations.
Introducing those markets and legal entitlements does not change the dimension of the
‘‘non-linear’’ part of the manifold (it is l+m&1 as well in the standard case), although the
dimension of the manifold itself increases a lot (it is multiplied by the number of agents): it
only contributes in increasing the dimension of the ‘‘linear part.’’ Especially, introducing those
legal entitlements increases a lot the relative dimension of the fibers in the equilibrium
manifold, and that is definitely the strongest interpretation we can give to the Coase theorem.
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Proposition 8. The natural projection 6 is proper.
Proof. This is entailed by condition (C); see Appendix 2.3. K
Fix now a regular economy 0=((|i), (|ki )) # 0 . Let |0=(|i0)1im be
a regular economy of the 0-economy, in a neighborhood of |=(|i) (it is
| if | is regular). Denote |t=(|it)1im where |it=t|i+(1&t) |i0 . The
smooth mapping G[(Ui), 0] : [0, 1]_R
l_Rm++_R
lm
++  R
l+m+lm is defined
the same way as F (Ui) , but with Uit and |it instead of Ui and |i . Notice
that G[(Ui), 0](1, ( p, *, X))=F[(Ui)]( p, *, X, 0) and
G[(U i ), 0](0, ( p, *, X ))=f[(ui ), (| i 0)]( p, (*i ), (xi ))=\
:
i=m
i=1
(xi&|i0)
+ .*iDui (xi )&p\ :i=mi=1 *i+&1p } (xi&|i0)
Thanks to Proposition 8: [The following proposition obtains]
Proposition 9. The mapping G[(Ui), 0] is a smooth proper mapping.
One then obtains that, since (|i0) is a regular economy of the
0-economy, the degree of G[(Ui), 0](1, } ) is defined and is the same as the
one of f[(ui), (|i 0)] which is known to be one (see Balasko [2, Math. 2.11]).
The last argument is to notice that if 0 (resp. |0) is a regular economy
then 0 is a regular value of G[(Ui), 0](1, } ) (resp. f[(ui), (|i 0)]); note also that
if [G(Ui), 0](1, } )]
&1(0)=< then 0 is regular. Then the following existence
result8 obtains.
Theorem 10. For all 0 # 0 , there exists an extended equilibrium.
The two following welfare theorems hold as well.
Theorem 11. Every classical equilibrium is a Pareto optimum. Recipro-
cally, let X be a Pareto optimum; there exists a price vector supporting X
(and corresponding distributions of initial endowments and legal
entitlements).
Proof. The proofs are standard and can be found in Cre s [9]. K
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8 Counter-examples can be found where there exists a unique extended equilibrium which
is not classical; then there is no classical equilibrium.
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3. The Model with Identical Consumers
The emphasis of this paper is on the possibility of symmetry breakings
when external effects are internalized through a complete system of
markets. The issue of symmetry breaking consists essentially in stating that
symmetric systems of equations can give rise to asymmetric solutions.
A means to create a symmetric system of equations is to study a market
composed with ‘‘identical’’ agents with respect to their fundamentals: utility
functions, initial endowments and legal entitlements (see, for example,
Malinvaud’s model for individual risks [13]). The agents being identical ex
ante, it is natural to expect that the market implement symmetric equi-
librium allocations. However, in fact, it is in general not always the case.
For this idea to appear clearer, let us first investigate the simple case of an
economy composed of two identical consumers.
3.1. The Leading Example
There are l commodities and two consumers 1 and 2 with identical utility
functions u+v, i.e., u(x1)+v(x2) for consumer 1 and u(x2)+v(x1) for
consumer 2 (xi represents agent i’s consumption). They both have | # R l++
as initial endowments in proper consumption goods, and |$ # Rl as legal
entitlements with respect to the consumption of the other. Under these
conditions the system of equilibrium equations (7), (5), (3), (8) becomes
{*1 Du(x1)+*2Dv(x1)=p*2 Du( x2)+*1 Dv(x2)=p (9)
*1+*2=1 (10)
x1+x2=2| (11)
*1Du(x1) } x1+*1Dv(x2) } x2
=p } |+(*1Dv(x2)&*2Dv(x1)) } |$. (12)
Definition 12. The set [( p(|)=12(Du(|)+Dv(|)), (12, 12),
(|, |), |, |$), (|, |$) # 0 ] is a 2l dimensional manifold of extended equi-
libria. It is the set of symmetric equilibria; for each economy (|, |$) there
exists one and only one symmetric equilibrium.
The central issue is the existence of asymmetric equilibria, i.e., equilibria
such that x1 {x2 . A sufficient condition is that *1 {*2 .9 Indeed
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indeed has Dv(x1){Dv(x2) otherwise Du(x1)=Du(x2) and then x1=x2); this condition is not
necessary.
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Proposition 5 states that to each equilibrium allocation corresponds a
unique supporting price ( p, *); and to x1=x2 (=|) corresponds
( p(|), (12, 12)).
We split the system of equilibrium equations into two pieces; Eqs. (9)
and (10) on the one hand, (11) and (12) on the other. Pick an asymmetric
solution y=( p, (*1 , *2), (x1 , x2)) of (9) and (10). The system of equations
(11) and (12) yields the endowments and entitlements (|, |$) compatible
with y, i.e., which make y feasible; it is a linear system of equations. By
(11), compatible initial endowments |>>0 are obtained. Then if
*1 Dv(x2)&*2 Dv(x1){0 the set of compatible legal entitlements |$, is
defined by equation (12). Finally, there exists a (l&1)-dimensional affine
space10 of (|, |$) # 0 compatible with the asymmetric allocation (x1 , x2).
It is already clear at this point in the line of reasoning that the presence
of some new parameters (legal entitlements) gives enough new degrees of
freedom to the model to compensate for the small dimension of the space
of initial endowments due to the identical characteristics of agents. In the
case developed here, the budget hyperplane, at a fixed allocation, remains
a big enough linear manifold to fulfill the equilibrium conditions for some
parameters.
Thus the issue reduces to a very simple analysis. Let Vf2 be the set of
elements y fulfilling Eqs. (9) and (10) and such that *1 {12. Let Vg2 be the
subset of Vf2 composed with the elements fulfilling in addition
*1 Dv(x2)&*2 Dv(x1)=0. Does there exist some y’s in Vf2 "Vg2? For we
know that these y’s are associated to asymmetric equilibria. A stronger
result obtains.
Proposition 13. Generically11 with respect to the external utility func-
tion v, Vf2 is a smooth manifold of dimension (l+1) whereas Vg2 is a sub-
manifold of Vf2 of dimension 1.
Moreover, for each fixed *1 # ]0, 1["[12] and | # R2++ there exists in
Vf2 an element associated to *1 such that x2+x1=2|; then Vf 2 is non empty.
Proof. See Appendix 3.1. K
The argument can go further. An identical line of reasoning shows that
Vf 2(|)i.e., the subspace of y # Vf2 such that x1+x2=2|is generically
in utility functions a submanifolds of Vf2 of dimension 1. If it lies entirely
in Vg2 , it cannot be stated that there exists an asymmetric equilibrium for
this |. However, Vf 2(|) and Vg2 both being manifolds of dimension 1,
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same initial endowments, since it is the dimension of a fiber for fixed total resources.
11 Throughout the paper, by generically, we mean for an open and dense set.
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there cannot exist an open set U of initial endowments | such that Vf2(|)
lies entirely in Vg2 for all | # U. Then, generically in initial endowments |,
there exist in Vf2(|) some open one-dimensional subsets of asymmetric
allocations, each of them associated with a (l&1)-dimensional fiber of legal
entitlements.
Theorem 14. Generically with respect to the external utility function v
and the initial endowments |, there exist an l-dimensional manifold of asym-
metric equilibria.
The following section will prove that asymmetric equilibria also appear
when the external utility function v is concave. A point needs to be stressed
that underlines the very distinctive feature of the model. Unlike in the
standard case, Balasko’s symmetrization argument fails, although the
symmetrized allocation is feasible whatever the specification of the legal
entitlements (it is the symmetric allocation: 12(x1+x2)=|). The point is
merely that there is no reason why u(|)+v(|) should be bigger than both
u(x1)+v(x2) and u(x2)+v(x1). The only property that can be stated is
that, when v is concave, if u(x1)+v(x2)u(|)+v(|), then u(x2)+
v(x1)u(|)+v(|), i.e., if one agent is better off with the asymmetric
allocation, then the other agent is better off with the symmetric one.
The interest of the paper will not increase much by studying how this
line of reasoning generalizes to a bigger economy. There is nevertheless one
point in this generalization that deserves to be developed and commented
on. It is to show that the number of parameters in the economy remains
big enough, despite the identical characteristics of the agents, to yield
enough degrees of freedom for the equilibrium conditions to hold at almost
every point of Vf2 . We shall see that the concept of identity defined in this
framework, although it is a full identity, preserves the usual number of
parameters, i.e., the number of agents times the number of goods.
3.2. The General Case
There are m agents and l commodities. The agents have the same utility
function u+v, i.e., u(xi)+v( } ) for agent i. They all have the same initial
endowments in physical consumption goods: | # R l++. As far as legal
entitlements are concerned, the identity between consumers does not
require that each couple of agents have exactly the same rights each on the
other. Take the example of three agents, let |21=|(1) and |
3
1=|(2) be the
rights of agent 1 on agents 2 and 3 respectively. Then the utility function
of agent 1 is u(x1)+v(x2 , x3): agent 2 (resp. agent 3) is said to be the agent
of type (1) (resp. type (2)) of agent 1.
To be identical to agent 1, agent 2 must be globally endowed with the
same legal entitlements on agents 1 and 3; i.e.; he must also have his agent
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of type (1) and his agent of type (2): he is endowed either with |(1) on
agent 1 and |(2) on agent 3 or with |(2) on agent 1 and |(1) on agent
3. The same for agent 3. However, reciprocally, if agent 1 ends up being the
agent of type (2) of both agent 2 and agent 3, whereas agent 2 ends up
being the agent of type (1) of both agent 1 and agent 3, then agent 1 and
2 cannot be said to be identical with respect to their ‘‘duties,’’ i.e., the rights
given to the others on their own consumptions.
Take two different agents i and k, for the concept of identity to be full,
the rights given on agent i to agents other than i must be globally similar
to the rights given on agent k to agents other than k. In our example with
three agents, this idea translates in the following way: the rights given to
agents 2 and 3 on agent 1 must be either (|(1), |(2)) or (|(2), |(1)).
It is useful to draw the following table. The i th row describes on whom
agent i is given the rights |(h), h=1, 2, and the j th column defines who
is given the rights |(h) on agent j (here agent 1 is given the rights |(1) on
agent 2 and |(2) on agent 3 and agent 2 (resp. agent 3) is given the rights
|(2) (resp. |(1)) on agent 1):
1 2 3
1 V |(1) |(2)
2 |(2) V |(1)
3 |(1) |(2) V
What is important for the concept of identity to be fully completed, is that,
in such a table, on each row and each column each vector of legal
entitlements appears one and only once. Then for an economy with three
agents, there are only two ways to distribute properly the rights, the second
one is described by the following table:
1 2 3
1 V |(2) |(1)
2 |(1) V |(2)
3 |(2) |(1) V
In the general case, there is a set L of (m&1) vectors of legal
entitlements given in the economy. Each agent must be endowed globally
with the whole set; i.e., he is endowed once and only once with each
element of this set on somebody else, whoever this person is. Reciprocally,
if one considers the set of rights the others have on him, it must cover the
whole set L too. And the same tables with the same properties can be
drawn as in the case with three agents.
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Let us formalize this idea for an economy with a finite number of agents.
Let M and Mi be respectively the sets [1, ..., m] and
[1, ..., i&1, i+1, ..., m] for all i; let L=[|(1), ..., |(m&1)] # R l(m&1)++ be
the set of legal entitlements in the economy. Let L denote the set
[1, ..., m&1] of types of agents. To agent i is associated a bijection
+i : L  Mi , such that the legal entitlements of i on j # Mi be
|(+&1i ( j )) # L. In other words, +i (k) is the agent on which consumer i is
given the rights |(k); he is the agent of type (k) of agent i and his con-
sumption bundle: x+ i(k) will appear in the k th position as an argument of
i’s external utility function:
u(xi)+v(x+i(1) , ..., x+i(m&1)).
Definition 15. The m-tuple (+i)1im is acceptable if and only if for
all i, [(+&1h (i))h # Mi]=L; i.e., the set of legal entitlements given to all agents
other than i on agent i himself covers the whole set of legal entitlements.
When there are two agents, there is only one way to allocate the legal
entitlements |$. When there are more than two agents, the number of
acceptable ways to allocate the (m&1) legal entitlements (i.e., the number
of acceptable m-tuples (+i)1im) increases very fast. It is 2 when m=3, 24
when m=4 and 1344 when m=5. More generally, it is the number of
Latin squares of size m with the integer m uniformly on the diagonal. It is
proved to be bigger than the number of Latin squares of size m&1 (see,
e.g., Van Lint and Wilson [19, p. 170]). The number Ln of Latin square of
size n is given by the formula n!(n&1)! ln where only the eight first values
of ln are known, l7 being already equal to 16, 942, 080. Another result that
speaks for itself is a ‘‘poor’’ lower bound of L(n): L(n)(n!)!.
An acceptable m-tuple of bijections from L into Mi defines the situation
described a few lines above. The agents indeed have identical charac-
teristics: the same utility functions, the same initial endowments and the
same network of legal entitlements on the others (as far as their rights are
concerned) and ‘‘against’’ them (as far as their ‘‘duties’’ are concerned). In
fact, it is possible to draw a diagram for each m-tuple: each agent is
represented by a point; from each point, (m&1) arrows start toward all the
other points, one for each vector of legal entitlements in L. The m-tuple
is acceptable when in this diagram, (m&1) arrows arrive at each point,
one for each vector of legal entitlements. Such a diagram will be called a
network. The agents are meant to be identical in the sense that the points
in this network cannot be distinguished because the same bundle of arrows
start from each of them and arrive at each of them.
Definition 16. A symmetric economy El is defined by a couple of
proper and external utility functions u and v, an acceptable network
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(+i)1im and a vector of initial endowments and legal entitlements
(|, (|(k))k # L # 0 .
The number of parameters in this economy is lm (the same as in an
economy free from external effects where the agents have the same
preferences but not necessarily the same initial endowments). It keeps in
the mathematical treatment enough degrees of freedom to allow for a lot
of asymmetric equilibria to appear.
It is necessary to define from +i a kind of inverse bijection &i from L into
Mi the following way: let k be an element of L, &i (k)=j, where j is the
agent such that +j (k)=i. In other words, &i (k) is the agent whose rights on
i are |(k). The acceptability of the m-tuple of bijections + entails the exist-
ence of the bijections &, and the following properties hold:
\(i, j, k) # M2_L, &i (k)=j if and only if +j (k)=i; and +&i(k)(k)=i.
The system of equilibrium equations defining the equilibria of a
symmetric economy is, along with the normalization condition (5):
*iDu(xi)+ :
h # L
*& i(h)Dhv[(x+ &i (h)(k))k # L]=p (13)
:
i=m
i=1
xi=m| (14)
*iDu(xi) } xi+ :
k # L
*iDk v[(x+ i(k$))k$ # L] } x+i(k)
=p } |+ :
k # L
[*iDkv[(x+ i(k$))k$ # L]
&*&i(k)Dk v[(x+ &i (h)(k$))k$ # L]] } |(k) (15)
Proposition 17. For an economy (|, (|(k))k # L) there exists a unique
symmetric equilibrium, defined by ps=1m(Du(|)+h=m&1h=1 Dhv(|, ..., |),
*i=1m and xi=| for all i. The set of symmetric equilibria is a smooth
manifold of dimension lm globally parameterized by the parameters:
(|, (|(k))1km&1).
Proof. Uniqueness comes from Proposition 5. K
Definition 18. An equilibrium (p, (*i)1im , (xi)1im , (|, (|(k))k # L)) is
asymmetric if there exist two different agents i and k such that xi {xk .
Proposition 19. An equilibrium ( p, (*i), (xi), (|, (|(k))) such that
there exist two different agents i and k with *i {*k is asymmetric.
Proof. See Proposition 5. K
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Since we deal here with extended equilibria, there is no way to compare
the Pareto efficiency of symmetric and asymmetric equilibria. However, at
the end of Section 4, the case where the external utility function is concave
is investigated: both kinds of equilibrium (symmetric or asymmetric) are
Pareto efficient.
First Remark. In the leading example, if (x1 , x2) is an asymmetric equi-
librium allocation associated with the economy (|, |$), then the vector
(x2 , x1) is too. This property can be generalized in the following way: if
there exists a bijection _ of the set of agents M such that for all i,
&_(i)=_ b &i , then if (xi)1im is an equilibrium allocation (symmetric or
not) of the economy [u, v, (+i), (|, (|(k))k # L)], (x_(i))1im is too.
Second Remark. Fix u, v, and (|, (|(k))k # L). For any equilibrium
(xi)1im for the network (+i) and any bijection _ of M, there exists an
acceptable network (+_i ), defined by: \i, +
_
i =_
&1 b +_(i) , such that (x_(i)) is
an equilibrium for the network (+_i ). The network (+
_
i ) defines the same
network of responsibilities as (+i), after having permuted the places of
the agents through the bijection _. These two networks are said to be
equivalent.
The two preceding remarks convey the impression that if (xi) is an asym-
metric equilibrium for a specified network, it is in general not one for
another network, even an equivalent one. An interesting issue is the study
of those equilibria which are equilibria for all the networks. One knows
that the symmetric equilibria have this property. The question to address
is whether there exist a reciprocal link. It will be addressed in Section 5.
4. The Asymmetric Equilibria
This section shows that the set of asymmetric equilibria can be very big,
even in the case where the external utility functions are concave. The line
of reasoning is close from the one followed in the leading example. There
is no chance here to prove the existence of asymmetric equilibria by
showing that they add some complement dimensions to the symmetric
equilibrium manifold in the set of equilibria (as was the case in Balasko
[3]) for the mere reason that if there were a manifold of asymmetric
equilibria, it would be of the same dimension as the symmetric one. The
fact is that in this framework the equilibrium set is in general not even a
manifold: there are, in the manifold of symmetric equilibria, bifurcation
points from which branches of asymmetric equilibria start. It would be
sufficient to prove the existence of at least one of those bifurcation
points. However, sufficient conditions are hard to obtain in such a general
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framework where few assumptions are made on utility functions. The exist-
ence will be proven here through a simpler analysis, by ‘‘computing’’ the
system of equilibrium equations, and splitting it into two piecesto exploit
the fiber-bundle structure: Eqs. (5) and (13) on the one hand, which yield
a vector of endogenous variables, and on the other hand, this latter vector
being fixed, Eqs. (14) and (15) which yield the compatible parameters
through a system of linear equations.
Let Vf be the set of vectors ( p, (*i), (xi)) # R l_Rm++_R
lm
++ fulfilling
Eqs. (5) and (13) and such that the m_m matrix
4 =\
*1
}
}
*m
*& 1 (1)
}
}
*& m (1)
} } }
} } }
} } }
} } }
*&1 (m&1)
}
}
*&m (m&1)
+
is invertible (condition (S)). It excludes obviously the even welfare distribu-
tion *i=1m, \i. Denote 4 the set of weights (*i) fulfilling (5) and condi-
tion (S).
Let Vg be the set of elements of Vf fulfilling in addition the condition
that the following (m&1)_l(m&1) matrix M( p, (*i), (xi)) does not have
full rank;
(*iDk v[(x+ i(k$))k$ # L]&*& i(k)Dk v[(x+ &i (h)(k$))k$ # L])(1im&1)_(1km&1) ,
the gradients being written horizontally.
Lemma 20. 4 is an open dense subset of the set 4 of (*i) # Rm++ fulfilling
(5).
Proof. The acceptability of the network (+i) entails that the weight *1
appears once and only once in each row and each column of 4 . Then
the matrix A1 built from 4 putting 1 instead of *1 and zero everywhere
else is invertible. For any small real = but a finite numberrelated to
the eigenvalues of the matrix (A1)&14 the matrix (11+=)(4 +=A1) is
invertible, can be taken arbitrarily close to 4 and ((11 + =)(*1 + =),
(11+=) *2 , ..., (11+=) *m) fulfills (5). K
The issue reduces here to show that the two sets Vf and Vg do not coin-
cide. Take an element y in Vf which is not in Vg . From (14), compatible
initial endowments | are found. Then Eqs. (15) can be read as a full rank
(since it is not in Vg) linear system of (m&1) equations with l(m&1)
unknowns (the legal entitlements (|(k))k # L). It yields an (l&1)(m&1)-
dimensional affine space of legal entitlements compatible with y. Since,
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thanks to condition (S), the welfare weights cannot be the even ones,
Proposition 5 entails that each point y in Vf"Vg supports an (l&1)(m&1)-
dimensional affine space of asymmetric equilibria.
Proposition 21. Generically with respect to the external utility functions
v, Vf is a smooth manifold of dimension l+m&1.
Moreover, for any 4 # 4 and any | # R l++, there exists at least one
element in Vf associated with (4, |).
Proof. See Appendix 4.1. K
The aim is now to prove that, at least generically with respect to the
utility functions v and u, the set Vg is ‘‘small’’ in Vf .
Proposition 22. For a residual subset of proper and external utility
functions u and v, Vg is the complement of an open and dense subset of the
manifold Vf .
Proof. See Appendix 4.2. K
Theorem 23. For a residual subset of proper and external utility func-
tions u and v, there exists an open and dense subset of the (l+m&1)-dimen-
sional manifold of asymmetric price-allocation vectors, each point of which
supports an (l&1)(m&1)-dimensional linear manifold of initial endowments
and legal entitlements.
These equilibria are not necessarily solutions of the maximization
programs of the consumers; they are only describing the first-order condi-
tions of these programs. Then the first welfare theorem does not hold for
all of them. But in the case where the external utility function v is strictly
concave, the line of reasoning followed in this section still holds (Vf is
always a smooth manifold and the perturbation technics used in the proof
of Propositions 21 and 22 keep the strict concavity of v, as it is argued for
u in the same proof). However, for a concave external utility function v, the
two concepts of equilibrium (classical and extended) coincide. This entails
in particular that all the equilibria are Pareto efficient and all the Pareto
efficient allocations can be described as equilibrium allocations. However,
there still exist many asymmetric equilibria.
That so many asymmetric equilibria may appear seems at first sight
surprising. Especially if one considers, as it was often argued, that Arrow’s
model for externalities allows to reproduce by analogy for an economy
presenting external effects the theoretical treatment performed for
economies without externalities. The fact that there exist symmetry
breakings in a totally complete and statics economy without uncertainty,
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where the agents have strictly concave utility functions and where the two
welfare theorems hold stresses the distinctive feature of this model, for
which the standard symmetrization argument fails.
Finally, it may be useful to recall from the leading example that in this
framework, asymmetric equilibria may also appear for even distributions of
welfare weights (*i=1m, \i) as well as when there is not any redistribution
of wealth through the legal entitlements (i.e., |(k)=|, \k).
5. The Equivariant Equilibria
At the end of Section 3, the concept of equivariant equilibrium alloca-
tions was introduced.
Definition 24. Let u, v, and (|, (|(k))k # L) be fixed. The equilibrium
( p, (*i), (xi)) (associated with the triple [u, v, (|, (|(k))k # L]) is equivariant
if it is an equilibrium allocation of the economy [u, v,
(+i)1im , (|, (|(k))k # L] for all acceptable networks (+i).
We investigate here the links between those allocations and the
symmetric ones. We know that a symmetric allocation is equivariant.
A simplified version of the model where the utility functions are completely
separable is set up for which an equivariant allocation is automatically
symmetric.
Take m3. The external utility function v is assumed to be totally
separable in the following sense: let x=(x1 , ..., xm&1) # R l(m&1)++ then
v(x)=v1(x1)+ } } } +vm&1(xm&1). The vk ’s are moreover assumed to be
concave. The interest of this model is twofold. First of all, the structure of
the set Vf is wealthier:
Proposition 25. Vf is then a smooth manifold which can be
parameterized globally by the l+m&1 variables ( p, *1 , ..., *m&1).
Proof. See Appendix 5.1. K
Second, the shape of the utility functions is reminiscent of the classical
models dealing with uncertainty (see, for example, Balasko [3] or
Malinvaud [13]). There is in this formulation a formal identity between
types of agents and states of nature or individual states. Consider agent i ’s
utility function:
u(xi)+v1(x+ i(1))+ } } } +vm&1(x+ i(m&1)).
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To each agent (i himself included) corresponds a utility function and a
vector of legal entitlements. We will refer to this economy as the separable
one.
Another assumption is made:
(R)-Assumption. There is one commodity (assume it is commodity l )
and two external utility functions (assume they are v1 and v2), such that for
all x # R l++
}v1(x)x(l ) } }
v2(x)
x (l ) } .
It means that an agent is always more sensitive to the consumption of
commodity l by his agent of type (2) than by his agent of type (1). An
illustration could be a firm with identical employees: one is always more
sensitive to the consumption of cigarettes by his office mate than by an
agent at the end of the corridor.
We know that asymmetric equilibria exist for this model where the utility
functions vi ’s are strictly concave. In this section it is only needed that they
be simply concave.
Proposition 26. In this separable economy, an equivariant equilibrium is
symmetric.
Proof. Let ( p, (*i), (xi)1im be an equivariant equilibrium. In this
simpler framework, Eqs. (13) become
*iDu(xi)+ :
h # L
*& i (h)Dvh(xi)=p.
Since it is independent from the network (+i), for all i and every couple of
bijections &i and &$i :
:
h # L
(*& i(h)&*&$i (h))Dvh(xi)=0.
This means that for all i, j the vector (vh(xi)x ( j )i )h # L is orthogonal to the
vector w& i, &$i=(*&i (h)&*&$i (h))h # L for each couple (&i , &$i).
Lemma 27. Take (*i)1im {(1m)1im then the orthogonal space of
the linear space engendered by the vectors w&, &$ for all (&, &$) is contained in
Vect(1, ..., 1).
Proof. Suppose, without any loss of generality, that [*1 , ..., *m&1]
reaches at least two values. Among all the values reached, choose the one
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which is reached the least. Suppose it is reached by n+1 values of i (for
example by i=m&n&1, ..., m&1). The matrix composed first with the
vectors (w$, { j, m&n&1)1im&n&2 ({j, j $ is the transposition between indices j
and j $ and $ is such that for all k # L, $(k)=k # Mn), then with the vectors
(w$, { 1, m&n&1+j $)1j $n . It is equivalent to the (m&1)_(m&2) matrix
Im&n&2 1 } } } 1
\ &1 } } } &1 01_n + ,0n_(m&n&2) &In
which clearly has full rank. On top of that a vector orthogonal to all the
columns of this matrix has all its coefficient equal. K
This lemma proves that the gradients (Dvh(xm))h # L are all equal. Such
a property is excluded by Assumption (R). Then all the weights *i are
equal. The global parametrization then entails that all the allocations are
the same. This proof still holds to show that an allocation which is an equi-
librium to a whole class of equivalent networks is symmetric. It holds too
in much more general frameworks but a priori fails each time there can be
asymmetric allocations associated with even welfare weights. K
6. Concluding Comments
The results obtained in this paper are essentially on the sensitiveness of
the equilibrium allocations to distributions of Coase-type rights on the
markets opened to trade on external effects. Symmetric agents may end up
being treated asymmetrically by a complete network of markets. Develop-
ing an intuition on the symmetry-breaking result seems to be a difficult
task. The fact that the standard argument of symmetrization for complete
market fails in this setup (cf. comments following Theorem 14) underlines
the distinctive features of this model. Dropping the assumption of
concavity on the external utility function, although it may multiply the
symmetry breakings, is not responsible for their occurrence. The idea to
implement market processes to internalize externalities aimed at improving
the allocative efficiency of the market. It does so. But the way the legal
entitlements are endowed has real effects on the economy and is not
immune to giving rise to phenomena such as inequality of treatment,
instability and so on, which are often considered undesirable. This state-
ment is a major criticism to an ‘‘all-market remedy’’ to the inefficiency
entailed by the presence of external effects in the economy.
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Appendix 2.1
Proof of Lemma 4. This property is insured by the (N)-Assumption. By
extraction of the (m&1) columns related to good 1, one obtains the follow-
ing m_(m&1) matrix:
Ml=\
v1(x~ 1)
x (l )2
&
u1(x1)
x (l )1
v1(x~ 1)
x (l )3
&
u1(x1)
x (l )1
} } }
v1(x~ 1)
x (l )m
&
u1(x1)
x (l )1
+ .u2(x2)x (l )2 &v2(x~ 2)x (l )1 v2(x~ 2)x (l )3 &v2(x~ 2)x (l )1 } } } v2(x~ 2)x (l )m &v2(x~ 2)x (l )1b b bvm(x~ m)
x (l )2
&
vm(x~ m)
x (l )1
vm(x~ m)
x (l )3
&
vm(x~ m)
x (l )1
} } }
um(xm)
x (l )m
&
vm(x~ m)
x (l )1
If there were no external effects with respect to commodity 1, this matrix
would become
Mol =
&
u1(x1)
x (l )1
&
u1(x1)
x (l )1
} } } } &
u1(x)
x (l )1
.
u2(x2)
x (l )2
0 } } } } 0
0 V } }
} } V } }
} } V 0
0 0 } } } 0
um(xm)
x (l )m
which clearly has all its extracted (m&1)-square matrices invertible (by the
strict monotonicity of the ui). Let us show that the (N)-Assumption
guarantees this result to hold also for Ml .
Let us prove first that the matrix Mlm obtained by elimination of the last
row of Ml is invertible. In each row i, except in the first one, there is only
one term which is ‘‘big’’ in the sense that it dominates the others; it is
the one expressed with a partial derivative of ui . The determinant of Mlm
can then be decomposed into two terms. The first one is obtained, as for
Molm , by the multiplication of all these dominant terms, and its absolute
value is bigger than >i=mi=1 (1&=i) ui (xi)x
(l )
i , and then bigger than
(1&E)m >i=mi=1 ui (xi)x
(l )
i , if we denote E=max1im =i . The second
one is the remaining of the determinant; it is formed by the multiplication
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of (m&1) terms of the matrix, less than (m&2) being dominant terms; and
so their absolute values are smaller than E p(1+E)m&p >i=mi=1 ui (xi)x
(l )
i ,
if there are p dominant terms in the product. The only thing that remains
to be proved is that
(1&E)m& :
1pm&2
:( p) E p(1+E)m&p>0
if :( p) denotes the number of dominant terms in the product defining an
element in the sum expressing the determinant. Since 1pm&2 :( p)=
&1+(m&1)! it is sufficient to check that (1&E)m>(m&1)! E(1+E)m&1.
It is right for E<(m!)&1. Ml is a full-rank (m&1)-square matrix extracted
from DV, then the result holds. K
Appendix 2.2
Proof of Lemma 6. Take K N a compact subset of Z =Rl_Rm++_
Diag(X )_0 . Denote KN (resp. K N) the projection of K N on the last
l(m&1) components of Diag(X ) (resp. on Diag(X )); one can choose K N
such that N # N K N=R lm++. Let BN be an open subset containing KN . It
is possible to build a smooth characteristic function :N of KN such that
:N(KN)=1 and :N((Diag(X ))2im"BN)=0.
Let S 1 be the unit ball of R l(m&1)++ and define, for s~ 1 # S 1 , the utility function
v1, s~ 1 # C
(Rl(m&1), R) by
v1, s~ 1 (x~ 1)=v1(x~ 1)+=:n(x~ 1) s~ 1 } x~ 1 .
One can obviously choose = such that, for the topology of uniform con-
vergence on compact sets, v1, s~ 1 is arbitrarily close to v1 , and u1+v1, s~ 1 still
is in U (recall that v1 has not to be concave).
Write down the Jacobian matrix of F (Ui)(Z, s~ 1), which is the map F (Ui)
written for v1=v1, s~ 1 on K N_S 1 . One obtains a (lm+l+m)_
(2lm+l+m+l(m&1)) matrix of the following shape (derivation resp. of
the blocks of Eqs. (4), (7), (3), (8), with respect to X, p, *, (|i), (|ki )k{i
and s~ 1),
DF (Ui )=\
Il } } } Il
V
0
V
0
J:
0
V
0
V
1 } } } 1
V
&Il } } } &Il
0
0
A
0
0
0
A
0
0
0
B
0
J;
0
V + ,
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where
&It
J:=\ b + and J;=\ 0l_l (m&1)*1=Il (m&1)+ .&Il lm_l
The (m&1)_lm matrix A, obtained by derivation of the (m&1) first
budget constraints with respect to (|i)1im (so that |m does not appear),
can be written, with p=( p(1), ..., p(l )),
&p 0 } } } 0 0
0 &p } } } 0 0
A=\ } } } 0+ .} } } 0
0 0 } } } &p 0
We extract the columns of DF (Ui ) of the derivations with respect to |m , p,
s~ 1 , *1 , and (| (l )i )1im&1 . Notice that the (N)-Assumption prevents p
(l )
from being zero; it is indeed strictly positive: one has p(l )=h pi(l )h \i, then
p(l )=(1m) h (i pi(l )h ). But
:
i
pi(l)h =*h { uhx (l )h (xh)+ :i{h
vh
x (l )i
(X h)= ,
which is strictly positive for =h small enough.
Then one obtains a square matrix of lm+l+m rows,
\
&Il
0
0
0
0
J:
0
V
0
J;
0
0
0
0
1
V
V
0
0
&p(l )I(m&1)+ ,
where
(J:J;)=\&ItV
0
*1=Il(m&1)+
is invertible. Then the Jacobian matrix of F (Ui ) defined on K N_S 1 has
always full-rank.
A straightforward application of a version of the transversality theorem
(cf. Golubitsky and Guillemin [12, Chap. II, Lemma 4.6]) allows one to
assume that for a dense open subset of S 1 , and then trivially for one s~ 1 , 0
is a regular value of the map F (Ui)( } , s~ 1) defined on K N .
It has been proved then that the set V 1N of utility functions v1 such that
0 is a regular value of F(Ui) on K N is dense. V 1N is obviously open thanks
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to the continuity of the determinant and the fact that K N is compact.
Denote V 1=N # N V 1N ; V 1 is obviously residual and hence dense in
C(Rl(m&1), R), since the Baire property holds for the topology used.
Finally the openness of V 1 follows from Lemma 4.5 of Golubitsky and
Guillemin [12] and the fact that the map F(Ui) varies continuously with
respect to the utility functions. K
Appendix 2.3
Proof of Proposition 8. Let K be a compact subset of 0 ; then there exist
(|ik$) and (|ik") such that for all (|ki ) # K, |i
k$|ki |i
k" \k, i. All one has
to prove is that >&1 (K) is compact.
Let X=(xki ) be an allocation (which then fulfills (4)) associated with
(|ki ) # K and ( p, ( p
k
i )) # S .
We have: xki =xk>>0\i, k and 
i=m
i=1 xi=
i=m
i=1 |i
i=m
i=1 |i" which
makes sure that the allocation X is uniformly bounded on K. It remains to
check that it is uniformly ‘‘far away’’ from the boundaries of X .
Let k(q)=( p(q) , ( pki(q)); * (q) ; X(q) ; 0(q)) be a sequence of >
&1 (K). We
already know that 0(q) bounded entails X(q) bounded in R lm+ . Moreover
0<*i(q)1. One can then consider that (*(q) ; X(q) ; 0(q)) converges to
(*; X; 0). The equations (6) then make sure that ( pki(q)))k{i converges to a
bounded value ( pki )k{i .
What remains to show is:
1. first that \i, j, x ( j )i doesn’t tend to 0, which secures that p
( j )
i <;
2. then that pi >>0 \i;
3. and finally that *>>0.
Suppose there is an i for which there exists a non-empty subset Ji
[1, ..., m] such that, for all j # Ji , x ( j )i(q)  0. Then the assumptions on the
utility functions ui imply that p ( j )i(q)  + for j # Ji and, through equations
(1) (especially because of h=mh=1 p
i( j )
h(q)=p
( j )
(q) , where p
i( j )
h(q) remains bounded
for k{i thanks to (C)-Assumption), one has p ( j )(q)  +; moreover it does
so in a way ‘‘equivalent’’ to the sequence p ( j )i(q) .
Consider now i ’s budget constraint (2); since (|ki ) # K and |i >>0, the
right side of the equation (income part) contains a term j # Ji p
( j ) } | ( j )i
tending toward infinity, the others remaining bounded because of the
(C)-Assumption. On the left side of the constraint, the only terms which
are likely not to be bounded are the following: j # Ji p
( j )
i } x
( j )
i . But p
( j )
(q)
tends toward infinity in a way equivalent to the way that p ( j )i(q) tend toward
infinity, x ( j )i(q) tends toward zero, and |
( j )
i(q) >>0 \j # Ji ; all these arguments
lead to a contradiction, which is that the right member becomes greater
than the left member in the budget constraint when q tends toward .
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Then x ( j )i(q) does not tend toward 0.
Now suppose there exist j, 1jl, and i such that pi=( p (1)i , ..., p
(l )
i )
with p ( j )i =0. From (6.1), one extracts *i Du
( j )
i (xi)=p
( j )
i =0 where
Du( j )i (xi)>>0 (Du
( j )
i reaches its strictly positive minimum on KX), thus
*i=0 and pki =0, \k. So, if we prove that *>>0 (point 3 above), then the
proof is over since point 3 entails point 2.
Without any loss of generality, suppose i=1 and *1=0. Consider the
vectors D ( j )i (X)=(Dv
i( j )
2 (X), ..., Dv
i( j )
m (X)) # R
m&1. One knows that the
space engendered by the family [(D ( j )i &D
( j )
1 )(X), 2im, 1jl] has
dimension exactly (m&1) since they constitute a matrix DV, which is
obtained from DV by elimination of the first row (see Lemma 4). Note
* =(*2 , ..., *m) # R(m&1). One has * } (D ( j )i &D
( j )
1 )(X)=0 (\i 1im \j
1jl ). A necessary condition is then * =0 which is impossible since in
this case i=mi=1 *i=
i=m
i=2 *i=1. K
Appendix 3.1
Proof of Proposition 13. Let V2 be the set of vectors ((*1 , *2),
(x1 , x2)) # R2l+2++ such that *1 {*2 . It is straightforward to prove that it is
a manifold of dimension 2l+2. Define the two smooth mappings f2 and g2 ,
respectively from V2 into Rl+1 and from V2 into R2l+1,
f2=\*1Du(x1)+*2Dv(x1)&*2Du(x2)&*1 Dv(x2)*1+*2&1 +
and
*1D( x1)&*2 Du(x2)
g2=\*2Dv(x1)&*1 Dv(x2)+ .*1+*2&1
Vf 2 (resp. Vg 2) is the set f
&1
2 (0) (resp. g
&1
2 (0)). It is straightforward to see
that Vg2 defines the elements of Vf 2 such that *1 Dv(x2)&*2Dv(x1)=0. The
proposition obtains by simple applying the regular value theorem to the
maps f2 and g2 . One only needs the following lemma:
Lemma 28. The set of external utility functions v # C(R l++ , R) such
that 0 is a regular value of f2 and g2 is a open and dense subset of
C(R l++, R).
Proof. The proof follows the same path as in Appendix 2.2. Take Kn a
sequence of compact subsets of V2 such that n # N Kn=V2 . Let Bn be an
open subset containing Kn . Consider a smooth characteristic function :n on
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Kn such that :n=1 on Kn and :n=0 on V2"Bn . Let S 2 be the unit ball of
Rl++ , and define, for s # S 2 , the utility function vs by
vs(x)=v(x)+=:n(x) s } x,
it is possible to choose = sufficiently small such that, for the topology of the
uniform convergence on compact sets, vs is arbitrarily close to v and still
admits all the properties required. Denote f2 the map defined from f2 on
Kn_S 2 ; the same for g2. The Jacobian matrices of f2 and g2 are
Jf2=\V1
V
1
V
0
V
0
=(*2&*1) I
0 +
and
V V *1D2u(x1) V 0
Jg2=\V V V V =(*2&*1)I+ .1 1 0 0 0
They clearly have full rank, since in V2 , *2 {*1 . Then, by the transver-
sality theorem (in its simple version: Chap. II, Lemma 4.6 in Golubitsky
and Guillemin [12]), for an open and dense subset of S , 0 is a regular
value of f2 defined on Kn ; the same argument holds true for g2. Take an
s in the intersection of these two sets. The utility function vs thus built
proves that the set Wn of utility functions such that 0 is a regular value of
both f2 and g2 on Kn is dense; it is also open since the determinant map
is continuous and Kn is compact. Take W2=n # N W2n ; it is residual in
C(R l++, R) and hence dense since the Baire property holds for the topol-
ogy used here on the space of utility functions. It is also open; this follows
from Lemma 4.5 of Golubitsky and Guillemin and the fact that the maps
considered varies continuously with respect to the utility functions. K
The second part of the proposition remains to be proved. Fix *1{12 #
]0, 1[, *2=1&*1 and r=2| # R l++. Consider 8: [0, 1]_(]0, r
1[_ } } } _
]0, rl[)  Rl
8(t, x1)=*1Du(x1)&*2Du(r&x1)+t(*2Dv(x1)&*1Dv(r&x1)).
It is clearly a smooth proper mapping. Indeed, if *1Du(x1)&*2Du(r&x1)
+t(*2Dv(x1)&*1Dv(r&x1)) remains bounded, since Assumption (C)
ensures us that *2Dv(x1)&*1Dv(r&x1) is uniformly bounded on
]0, rl[_ } } } _]0, rl[, then x1 must remain far away from the boundaries of
]0, r1[_ } } } _]0, rl[; because of the assumptions on u, whose derivatives
with respect to a variable tending toward zero tend toward infinity.
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Then ,=8(0, } ) and =8(1, } ) are defined on ]0, r1[_ } } } _]0, rl[
(smooth manifold of dimension l ) to Rl, have the same degree modulo 2.
And , is known to be of degree 1. Finally, 0 is a regular value of both ,
and  (for a convenient v). Hence the proof. K
Appendix 4.1
Proof of Proposition 21. Let us follow the same line of reasoning as for
Proposition 13. Denote V the set of vectors ( p, (*i), (xi)) # Rl_4 _R lm++. It
is a manifold of dimension l+m&1+lm. Define the smooth mapping f
from V into Rlm:
f=\*iDu(xi)+ :h # L *& i(h) Dh v[(x+ &i (h)(k))k # L]&p+1im .
Lemma 29. The set of external utility functions v # C(R l(m&1)++ , R) such
that 0 is a regular value of f and is an open and dense subset of
C(R l(m&1)++ , R).
Proof. Following the same principle of perturbation as in the proof of
Lemma 28 in the preceding appendix, the Jacobian matrix of f , smooth
mapping from Kn_S , where S is the unit ball of R l(m&1)++ , is (derivatives
with respect to (*i), (xi), p, s1 , ..., sm&1, in this order):
V V &I =*& 1 (1)I } } } =*& 1 (m&1)I
Jf =\ } } } } } } } } + .V V &I =*& m (1)I } } } =*& m(m&1) I
Consider the square matrix composed with the lm last columns. By elemen-
tary computations (subtract the first l-block-rows to the (m&1) others), it
has the same rank as
\
I
0
}
0
*&1 (1)I
(*& 2 (1)&*& 1 (1)) I
}
(*& m (1)&*& 1 (1)) I
} } }
} } }
} } }
} } }
*&1 (m&1) I
*& 2(m&1)&*& 1 (m&1)) I
}
*& m (m&1)&*& 1 (m&1)) I
+ ,
which is invertible thanks to condition (S). Indeed, 4 is equivalent to (add
to the first column all the others to obtain 1 everywhere in the first column
and then subtract the first row to all the others):
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\
1
0
}
0
*& 1 (1)
*& 2(1)&*&1 (1)
}
*& m (1)&*&1 (1)
} } }
} } }
} } }
} } }
*& 1 (m&1)
*& 2(m&1)&*& 1 (m&1)
}
*& m (m&1)&*& 1 (m&1)
+ .
The same argument as in Appendix 3.1, Lemma 28, ensures us that the set
of compatible external utility functions v: W=n # N Wn is open and dense
in C(R l(m&1)++ , R). K
The regular value theorem allows one to conclude that generically, Vf is
a smooth manifold of dimension l+m&1. K
Appendix 4.2
Proof of Proposition 22. Take a point Z=( p, 4, (xi)) in Vf . The idea is
to perturb the utility functions so that Z remains in Vf but is not in Vg .
Consider the linear perturbations on v used in the preceding proof and
similar linear perturbations of the proper utility function u;
ut(x)=u(x)+=;Z(x) t } x, vs(X)=v(X)+=;Z(x) s } X,
where t is in Rl, s=(si)1im&1 in Rl(m&1) and ;Z is the characteristic
function of a compact neighborhood of Z. For well chosen reals = and
characteristic functions ;Z , the perturbed proper utility function ut still
fulfills the standard condition of strict monotonicity and strict concavity
(first the perturbation occurs on a compact, second it can be as small as
required). For details, see Rojas [14].
In this proof, the perturbation will concern only the variables related to
the last commodity l. Take then t=(0, ..., 0, tl ) and si=(0, ..., 0, sli ). For Z
to remain a point of Vf , it is necessary and sufficient that it still fulfills
Eqs. (13) written with ut and vs . Then the only condition is:
(*i&*1) tl+ :
h # L
(*&i (h)&*& 1(h)) s
l
h=0, \i.
It is a linear system of m unknowns and m&1 independent equations (the
extracted matrix composed with the coefficient of the variables slh is inver-
tible); the set of solutions is a linear space of dimension 1.
Take M ls, t(Z), the m&1 square matrix extracted from M(Z) (written for
ut and vs) by cancelling all the columns but those related to commodity l.
It can be decomposed into two parts,
Mls, t(Z)=M
l (Z)+=[4$1sl1 } } } 4$m&1s
l
m&1],
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where 4$i is the (m&1)-dimensional vector (*i&*& i (k))(1km&1) . Then the
m&1 square matrix 4 (s)=[4$1s$1 } } } 4$m&1slm&1] is invertible (and for all
the values of = but a finite number, related to the eigenvalues of
4 (s)&1 M l (Z), M ls, t is invertible too). Take indeed 4 , which is invertible,
add the m&1 first rows to the last one and then subtract the first column
to all the m&1 others, then one obtains
\
*1
}
*m&1
1
&4 $
0 } } } 0+ ,
where 4 $ is the matrix [4$1 } } } 4$m&1].
What is obtained at this point of the proof is that for a dense (and of
course open, the determinant being a continuous mapping and one deals
here with compact sets) set YZ _WZ of utility functions u and v fulfilling
all the assumptions of this model, M(Z) has full rank.
Take a point 4 # 4 Q =4 & Q a vector of rational welfare weights. Take
also | # Q l++. Consider the set X(*, |) of vectors ( p, (xi)1im) such that
(13) and (14) hold for this couple (*, |). It is a finite set. Indeed, the map-
ping defining this set is a submersion between two manifolds of same
dimension: l(m+1), at least for v # W (see the proof of Lemma 29); then
X(*, |) is a discrete set. However, it is furthermore in a compact since all
the consumptions are strictly positive and bounded by Eqs. (14). All these
results entail that the set XQ =(*, |) # 4 Q_Q l++X(*, |) is countable.
The mapping f defining Vf being smooth, Q l++ being dense in R
l
++ and
4 Q being dense in 4 , XQ is dense in Vf . Take (u, v) # [Z # X Q YZ]_
[Z # X Q WZn # N Wn]=Y _W , which is residual in C
(R l(m&1)++ , R)_
C(R l++, R), hence dense. Then M
l (4, (xi)) has full rank on XQ and the
continuity entails that it has full rank for a dense subset of the manifold Vf .
Hence Vg is the complement of an open and dense subset of Vf . K
Appendix 5.1
Proof of Proposition 25. In the framework of this section, Eqs. (17)
become
\*iDu+ :h # L *& i (h)Dvh+ (xi)=p. (16)
The proper utility function u is strictly concave and the external one (vh)
are concave. Then the map (*i Du+h # L *&i(h)Dvh) is strictly concave.
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Since it is defined on a rectangle (R l++) the theorem of Gale and Nikkaido
[10] holds here and entails that this map is univalent. The allocation xi is
so uniquely defined if p and the welfare weights are fixed. A simple applica-
tion of Lemma 3.2.1 in Balasko [2] allows one to conclude. K
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